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In this book, Charles Larmore develops an account of morality, freedom, and reason that rejects the naturalistic metaphysics shaping much of modern thought. Reason, Larmore argues, is responsiveness to reasons, and reasons themselves are essentially normative in character, consisting in the way that physical and psychological facts - facts about the world of nature - count in favor of possibilities of thought and action that we can take up. Moral judgments are true or false in virtue of the moral reasons there are. We need therefore a more comprehensive metaphysics that recognizes a normative dimension to reality as well. Though taking its point of departure in the analysis of moral judgment, this book branches widely into related topics such as freedom and the causal order of the world, textual interpretation, the nature of the self, self-knowledge, and the concept of duties to ourselves.
In this book, Charles Larmore develops an account of morality, freedom, and reason that rejects the naturalistic metaphysics shaping much of modern thought. Reason, Larmore argues, is responsiveness to reasons, and reasons themselves are essentially normative in character, consisting in the way t...
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Charles Larmore is W. Duncan MacMillan Family Professor in the Humanities at Brown University. He is author of thirteen books, including The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge, 1996), Les pratiques du moi (2004), The Autonomy of Morality (Cambridge, 2008), Das Selbst in seinem Verhältnis zu sich und zu anderen (2017), and What is Political Philosophy? (2020).
Charles Larmore is W. Duncan MacMillan Family Professor in the Humanities at Brown University. He is author of thirteen books, including The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge, 1996), Les pratiques du moi (2004), The Autonomy of Morality (Cambridge, 2008), Das Selbst in seinem Verhältnis zu sich und ...
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